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Abstract We analyze the determinants of interest rates on long-term government
bonds within the eurozone to assess whether the recent divergence in interest rates is
attributable to changes in common economic fundamentals. First, we argue that the
panel regression approach commonly employed in existing literature has conceptual
as well as empirical problems. Therefore we take an event study approach using
high-frequency (daily) data to investigate the impact of three categories of news
events on eurozone bond yields. Our results indicate that yields react to news on key
economic indicators such as growth and budget deficit forecasts. By contrast, we do
not find evidence that investors react to announcements of fiscal bailouts or austerity
measures.
Keywords Interest spreads  Public debt  Event study
JEL Classification G12  G14  H63
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, interest rates on government
bonds began to diverge dramatically within the eurozone after they had been
converging in the decade before. While some governments (like the German
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other countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) experienced a sharp and
sudden increase in their borrowing costs bringing them to (and, in the case of
Greece, beyond) the brink of default. The eurozone governments together with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) responded to this crisis with extensive loans to
the troubled governments conditional on a set of fiscal and structural reforms.1 The
primary goal of these reforms is to rebuild the confidence of creditors in the
solvency of the governments by reducing the public debt relative to GDP and to
enhance the overall productive potential of the economy. This policy rests on the
proposition that the crisis was caused by a deterioration in the fundamental
determinants of public sector solvency and that it can be solved only by improving
these fundamentals.
However, this proposition is cast into doubt by two observations: (1) some of the
crisis countries did not feature ‘‘bad fundamentals’’ prior to 2008. Ireland and Spain,
in particular, had debt-to-GDP ratios below the eurozone average and were even
running primary budget surpluses before 2009. (2) Some countries outside the
monetary union that had equally bad fundamentals did not experience a debt crisis.
The United Kingdom as well as the United States both have debt levels comparable
to the eurozone crisis countries and yet continue to borrow at much lower interest
rates.
The last point has been made most forcefully by De Grauwe (2012), who argues
that the eurozone debt crisis was caused by a self-fulfilling shift in investor
sentiments resulting in a run on eurozone government debt. Such a run, De Grauwe
argues, is more likely to occur in a monetary union, in which governments cannot
rely on their national central banks to act as lenders of last resort. Corsetti and
Dedola (2013) underpinned this point by a more rigorous model analysis. Recent
work by De Grauwe and Ji (2013) has sought to verify this alternative explanation
of the eurozone debt crisis empirically. More generally, the above observations raise
the question whether and to what extent government bond yields are driven by
fundamentals as opposed to market sentiments.
Before answering this question, one first needs to clarify what the fundamental
determinants of government solvency are. In the existing empirical studies on the
determinants of government bond yields, it is customary to explain the yield spreads
by measures of public sector solvency like the debt-to-GDP ratio, as well as
measures of ’macroeconomic vulnerability’ such as the current account balance or
the size of the banking sector. The choice of explanatory variables is usually not
derived from an explicit theoretical model. This paper starts from the well-known
intertemporal budget constraint of the government to single out those variables that
determine government yield spreads. Using the insights from this theoretical
discussion we study the determinants of (long-term) government bond yields of
European countries.
The existing literature on the issue has relied mainly on panel regression
frameworks with low frequency (usually quarterly) data. However, this approach
1 Such ‘‘bailout packages’’ were given to Greece in March 2010, to Ireland in November 2010, to
Portugal in May 2011, and to Cyprus in 2013. Spain and Italy engaged in similar reforms, but did not
receive direct loans from other governments.
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has a number of econometric problems which we discuss in the paper. Most
importantly, we doubt that the effects of the explanatory variables of the countries
analyzed are homogenous enough to be studied in a panel framework. We therefore
employ a random coefficients model using quarterly data for 17 European countries,
which allows us to test whether the poolability assumption underlying the panel
approach is warranted for our sample.
In a second step we look at high-frequency (daily) data to shed more light on the
determinants of government borrowing costs. However, the use of daily interest rate
data makes a regression approach infeasible, because the required explanatory
variables are not observed at this frequency. Hence we rely on event study
techniques to investigate what kind of economic and financial market news have a
significant impact on government interest rates. We focus on three categories of
news, which we interpret as news about underlying fundamentals of public sector
solvency: official macroeconomic forecasts, the announcement of intra-govern-
mental fiscal assistance measures and the announcements of fiscal reforms
(‘‘austerity packages’’). In so far as these news events contain new information
on fundamentals for investors, we expect them to change interest rates significantly.
A lack of reaction to news thus suggests that interest rates are indeed unrelated to
fundamentals.
The remainder of the paper is in four sections. The next section looks at the
intertemporal budget constraint of the government to derive the fundamentals of
government bond yields which we use in our empirical investigation. Section 3
reports and discusses the results of our random coefficient estimation. In Sect. 4, we
turn to daily data and conduct the event study. The final section summarizes the
main results of the paper.
2 The fundamental determinants of government borrowing costs
Differences in government bond yields result from the differences in the perceived
riskiness of these bonds. In general, this risk contains a default risk element as well
as a liquidity risk and an exchange rate risk element. For interest spreads within the
eurozone, the exchange rate risk element is, of course, absent. Thus one can expect
the default risk to dominate as a determining factor of within-EMU spreads. Default
risk is in turn determined by the government’s future ability (and willingness) to
service its debt and by the loss to investors given default. The central tool to
evaluate the government’s future solvency is the intertemporal budget constraint.
Let Dt denote gross real government debt at time t, PSt the primary government
budget balance (non-interest government revenues minus non-interest government
expenditures) and rt the real interest rate on government debt maturing at t.
Government debt evolves according to:
Dtþ1 ¼ Dtð1þ rtÞ  PSt: ð1Þ
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This condition rules out ‘bubbles’ in the government bond market. Combining (2)








A violation of the intertemporal budget constraint implies an infinitely exploding
debt level and thus a fundamental insolvency of the government. It is instructive to
look at (4) in a non-stochastic steady state where the real interest rate is constant
(rt ¼ r for all t) and real GDP grows at a constant (exogenous) rate g. A stable debt-
to-GDP ratio for a government with primary surplus growing proportionally to the








In this equation, r must be interpreted to be the risk-free real interest rate. The
equation can be read in two ways. For a given risk-free interest rate and given real
GDP growth rate, it defines the necessary primary surplus (relative to GDP) that
exactly stabilizes a given debt-to-GDP ratio. Alternatively, it defines a sustainable
(i.e. non-exploding) debt-to-GDP ratio for given primary surplus, risk-free interest
rate and growth rate. Equation (5) is not a sufficient condition for a sustainable debt-
to-GDP ratio in the sense that it rules out a government default. It merely defines
combinations of debt and primary surplus levels which are consistent with a con-
stant debt-to-GDP ratio.
Equation (5) may thus be used as an indicator for long-run public sector solvency
since a violation of (5) makes a government default more likely. The probability of
default increases with the debt-to-GDP ratio, decreases with rising primary surplus
(as a share of GDP) and decreases with a rising real growth rate. A higher
probability of default induces a higher risk premium on government bonds.
Thus, the sovereign risk premium depends on the debt-to-GDP ratio, the expected
growth rate and the expected primary budget surplus. We use the spread of the
interest rate on government bonds of a particular country over the interest rate on
the corresponding German bonds as our measure of the country-specific risk
premium. We can do this because the German government debt is generally
considered to be risk-free. In the empirical analysis, we therefore explain the
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government bond yield spread of a country by the fundamentals from the
intertemporal budget constraints: the debt-to-GDP ratio, the growth rate of real
GDP, and the primary surplus as a share of GDP.
These are also the most commonly used variables in the existing literature
assessing the effects of changes in the fundamentals on interest rate spreads or credit
default swap (CDS) spreads. These papers differ in (1) the endogenous variable
which is bond yield spreads (e.g., Attinasi et al. 2011; Gerlach et al. 2010;
De Grauwe and Ji 2013; Steinkamp and Westermann 2014) or CDS spreads
(Aizenman et al. 2013), (2) the main explanatory variable which is ‘‘fiscal space’’
(Aizenman et al. 2013), the debt-GDP ratio (De Grauwe and Ji 2013), the size of the
banking sector (Gerlach et al. 2010), announcements of bank rescue packages
(Attinasi et al. 2011), or the share of liabilities held by senior creditors (Steinkamp
and Westermann 2014), and (3) the econometric method employed, which is fixed
effect panel estimation (De Grauwe and Ji 2013; Steinkamp and Westermann 2014),
dynamic panel estimation (Attinasi et al. 2011; Aizenman et al. 2013) or a random
coefficients model (Gerlach et al. 2010).
The paper that comes closest to our approach of choosing explanatory variables is
Beirne and Fratzscher (2013) who also start from the government’s intertemporal
budget constraint. Based on panel regressions, they find that the increase of interest
rate spreads in the eurozone can be explained by a combination of deteriorating
fundamentals and an increased sensitivity of investors for these fundamentals. We
believe that their analysis suffers from the problems we find with the panel approach.
In addition to the fundamental fiscal variables, measures for the liquidity of the
bond market are proposed in the literature. While liquidity measures have been
found significant in determining government bond yield spreads in Beber et al.
(2009), we refrain from using them, because they are either (endogenous) price
measures or just another variable expressing total government debt. Global risk
factors are also excluded because they cancel out when bond yields of a country are
measured relative to the German bond yield.
One risk factor, however, should be addressed: exchange rate revaluation risk.2 Not
controlling for expected exchange rate changes in the regression could lead to biased
estimates for our sample of non-eurozone countries.Whilewe are aware of this potential
problem, we do not find the solutions offered in the existing literature satisfactory. For
instance, De Grauwe and Ji (2013) use the real effective exchange rate to control for
changes in price competitiveness. By excluding depreciation expectations we are
implicitly assuming that investors expect the exchange rate to be unchanged in the
future. This assumption can be justified by the Meese and Rogoff (1983) result that the
exchange rate follows a random walk over short horizons (up to 12 months).
Therefore we estimate an econometric model of government bond yield spreads
relative to German bonds including the debt-to-GDP ratio, the primary budget
deficit, and real GDP growth as explanatory variables.3 We estimate panel models
2 We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
3 We use contemporaneous variables because at the particular time expected future values are not
available at quarterly basis. We checked with forecast from the World Economic Outlook which reduced
the number of observations by half because there are only two WEO forecast per year. the results are less
robust but in line with the results presented in the paper.
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for the 17 countries in our sample but, in contrast to much of the literature, allowing
for country-specific slope coefficients. This set-up enables us to assess which
countries are homogenous enough to be grouped to a panel analysis.
3 Evidence from quarterly data
Our sample comprises 17 European countries, of which 10 (Austria, Belgium,
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain) are
members of the eurozone and seven are not (the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom). We excluded all
European countries which have changed their currency regime after 2001. For
included countries we obtained interest rates on 10-year benchmark bonds reported
by the European Central Bank (ECB) on a quarterly basis.4 Data on gross public
debt, gross domestic product, primary government budget deficits come from
Eurostat and are observed from the 1st quarter 2001 up to the 1st quarter 2013.
‘‘Appendix 1’’ contains a detailed description of our data.
The countries in the sample differ greatly with respect to the spread of the interest
rate paid on their 10-years government bond over the German government bond
benchmark. Figure 1 shows the time series of benchmark bond yields for four sub-
samples: eurozone non-crisis countries seen in (a), eurozone crisis countries seen in
(b), and non-eurozone old-EU countries seen in (c), and non-eurozone new
accession countries in (d).
Our basic econometric model uses a set of ‘‘fundamentals’’ to explain the spread
of national interest rates over the German benchmark rate. The choice of
fundamentals is guided by the theoretical considerations from the last section. We
start with panel mean-group estimations which allow for heterogeneity among
different countries in their estimated coefficients. Mean-group estimators are
designed for ’moderate-T, moderate-N’ macro panels as ours, where moderate
typically means from around 15 time-series/cross-section observations. The
procedure has two steps: (1) the estimation of a group-specific regression and (2)
averaging the estimated coefficients across groups.
In this set-up, the slope parameters need not be homogeneous across countries
(i.e. for all i, bi0 ¼ b0; bi1 ¼ b1 etc. is not required). For each country i, the
regression equation is
spreadit ¼ bi0 þ bi1debtit þ bi2growthit þ bi3deficitit þ it; ð6Þ
where debt is the government debt in percent of GDP, growth is the growth rate of
real GDP, and deficit is the primary government budget deficit in percent of GDP. it
is a zero-mean error. The estimated coefficients are averaged and shown in Table 1.
The first column shows the results for the entire sample. We estimate a positive and
significant coefficient on debt and a negative and significant coefficient on growth,
which is what we would expect from our theoretical discussion. The coefficient on
4 Not all governments actually issue bonds with 10-year maturity. Therefore, the ECB calculates
reference yields using government bonds with maturities close to 10 years.
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deficit is negative but only significant at the 10 % level. These results are similar to
fixed effects estimations (which are not presented) and also broadly in line with
those of De Grauwe and Ji (2013).
The columns in Table 1 show results for the whole sample and four sub-samples:
eurozone countries only, non-eurozone (or ‘‘stand-alone’’) countries, eurozone crisis
countries, and eurozone non-crisis countries. There is considerable variation in the
estimated parameters and their significance that cast doubts on the informative value
of the full sample estimates. In fact, the results obtained with the full sample seem to
be driven to a large extent by the eurozone crisis countries. While the signs are
similar, the size of the effects differs by a magnitude of ten and more. The
‘‘eurozone crisis countries’’ and the ‘‘eurozone non-crisis countries’’ subsamples are
best comparable because all member countries share the same currency. The two
panel estimations reveal large differences in the size of the effects of the
determinants of the risk premium. The results for the non-eurozone countries should
be interpreted with caution since exchange rate expectations are not controlled for.
Looking at the large differences of the coefficients between the groups, it is worth







































Fig. 1 Government bond yield spreads over Germany. a Eurozone non-crisis countries. b Eurozone crisis
countries. c Non-eurozone old-EU countries. d Non-eurozone accession countries
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We therefore report the first stage of the mean group panel estimator and look at the
parameters bi0; bi1; . . . differences across countries.
Table 2 provides the results from the first stage estimation for all countries in the
sample. The general picture emerging from this regression is quite clear: the
estimated slope parameters differ substantially between countries. While the signs
of the coefficients are widely in line, their sizes and statistical significance differ
greatly. These results indicate that the impact of fundamentals on government bond
yields is very inhomogeneous and that there is no tight relationship between
fundamentals and spreads except for those countries that actually experienced a
crisis. For Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal, debt has a fairly strong and
highly significant positive effect on the spread. For the other eurozone countries as
well as for the non-eurozone countries, the estimated debt parameters are much
smaller, vary in sign and are not always significant.
The effect of real GDP growth is even more heterogeneous across countries.
Higher growth rates are not generally associated with significantly lower spreads. In
the case of Ireland and Portugal, this finding can be explained by the fact that the
rise in the spreads occurred after the recession of 2009/10 reached its trough and the
economy was already starting to recover. The estimated parameters on primary
deficits are rather puzzling at first glance. For some countries, including the crisis-
countries Ireland and Spain, primary deficits seem to have a negative impact on
borrowing costs. The explanation for this seemingly perverse result is that by the
time the Greek and Irish spreads started to rise in 2010, the government’s primary
balance was actually improving, whereas during the years before the crisis, the
spreads where very low and the primary balance was modestly negative in the case
of Greece and modestly positive in the case of Ireland. For most of the other
countries, the estimated primary deficit parameters have the expected (positive)











Debt 0.025** 0.054** 0.003 0.126*** 0.018***
(0.012) (0.026) (0.012) (0.031) (0.006)
Growth -0.036** -0.034*** -0.072 -0.022 -0.035***
(0.016) (.012) (0.045) (0.105) (-0.009)
Deficit 0.039* -0.004 0.031 -0.236 0.023
(0.024) (0.089) (0.029) (0.180) (0.039)
Constant -0.383 -1.673** 0.914 -9.477 -0.933**
(0.584) (0.658) (0.781) (4.180) (0.474)
Observations 833 490 343 245 245
Groups 17 10 7 5 5
Dependent variable: 10 year interest spread over Germany
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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sign. Finally, note the sizeable differences in the constant terms which raise some
doubts on the specification given that the yields of the eurozone countries did not
differ much until 2010.
Table 2 Mean group panel estimator, first stage
Debt Growth Deficit Constant
Austria 0.028*** -0.061*** 0.051*** -1.520**
(0.010) (0.016) (0.031) (0.677)
Belgium 0.020** -0.014 0.173*** -1.164**
(0.009) (.035) (0.026) (0.879)
Finland 0.0003 -0.026*** -0.019** 0.270
(0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.197)
France 0.028*** -0.045*** -0.047 -1.581***
(0.003) (0.016) (0.022) (0.203)
Netherlands 0.010*** -0.029*** 0.009 -0.358*
(0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.190)
Greece 0.215*** -0.413 -0.547** -19.506***
(0.053) (0.257) (0.254) (6.454)
Ireland 0.050*** 0.169*** 0.131*** -2.019***
(0.006) (0.048) (.031) (0.319)
Italy 0.150*** -0.099** -0.337*** -16.193***
(0.014) (0.042) (0.128) (1.604)
Portugal 0.142*** -0.019 -0.497*** -7.460***
(0.012) (0.116) (0.138) (0.927)
Spain 0.072*** 0.003 0.101*** -3.023***
(0.009) (0.079) (0.043) (0.467)
Denmark 0.005** -0.038*** -0.018*** -0.064
(0.002) (0.008) (0.007) (0.104)
Norway -0.026*** -0.019 0.050*** 2.374***
(0.006) (0.019) (0.018) (0.248)
Sweden 0.032*** 0.008 0.096*** -1.136***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.013) (0.141)
United Kingdom -0.004 0.055*** .073*** 0.501***
(0.003) (0.016) (0.019) (0.132)
Czech Republic -0.007 -0.136*** -0.046 1.472***
(0.014) (0.028) (0.051) (0.572)
Hungary 0.058** -0.127*** -0.056 0.314
(0.023) (0.055) (0.063) (1.648)
Poland -0.028 -0.278*** 0.118 4.773***
(0.029) (0.080) (0.145) (1.358)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
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To test for poolability of the heterogenous countries in one panel regression we
run a random coefficient panel estimation that uses the same first stage regression
and tests for poolability. The test is algebraically identical to a test of equality of the
country specific coefficients (Johnston and DiNardo 1997). We present the test
results for the whole sample and the four sub-group panel regression in Table 3.
Besides treating heterogeneous countries adequately, an attractive feature of the
mean group estimator is that it’s common correlated effects version can handle non-
stationary variables. Non-stationarity found in the time-series of the spreads and the
debt-to-GDP ratios is therefore well treated. We nevertheless report Augmented
Dickey–Fuller and Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt-Shin tests in ‘‘Appendix 2’’
(Tables 9 and 10). Applying this estimator reduces the significance of the
coefficients considerably. Results for whole sample and the subsample of eurozone
countries are given in Table 11 in ‘‘Appendix 2’’.
The bottom line from the mean group estimator-approach is that the evidence
drawn from regression analysis using quarterly data is the relationship between
‘‘fundamentals’’ and interest spreads is country-specific. One way to proceed would
be the route taken by Gibson et al. (2012) and look at cointegration relationships
and VEC models. The great advantage of this approach is the ‘natural’ benchmark it
provides in assessing the spreads. We nevertheless decided against using time-series
techniques because the pattern in the crisis might not be well explained by slow-
moving long-run determinants. From an empirical perspective it is questionable
whether using quarterly and in some cases monthly data is appropriate in explaining
the movements of interest rates or their spreads during the crisis. A graph of the
bond yields as given in Fig. 2 for Greece is instructive. Up to early 2010, the yields
have barely changed. After 2010, however, they have changed drastically at certain
dates. This indicates why lower frequency data might be not optimal for explaining
the changes in yield spreads. Also, visual inspection suggests that movements in
spreads are related to specific news events such as the announcement of a fiscal
assistance package in May 2010. In the next section, we use event study techniques
on high frequency (daily) data to support this hypothesis more rigorously.
4 Evidence from an event study with daily data
The econometric analysis of the previous section reveals that it is hard to establish a
common pattern in the determinants of yield spreads in the eurozone. On the other
hand, so far there is no reason to claim that sentiments which are unrelated to











v2 2866 1137 1510 489.4 162.9
Prob[ v2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
H0 Parameter constancy
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fundamentals are driving these risk premia. To study the determinants of the yield
spread further, we use higher frequency data of government bond yields in the crisis
countries.
The data on government bond yields in this section are taken from the Thomson-
Reuters Datastream and consist of daily observations of the effective annual yield of
government bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years. For the event study exercise
we restrict the analysis to the five ‘‘crisis countries’’, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, and Spain. The critical task in our event study is the identification and
selection of events. We differentiate between three categories of events: ‘‘economic
forecasts’’, ‘‘fiscal assistance’’ and ‘‘austerity measures’’. We focus on these events,
because they are most closely connected to news about the fundamental solvency of
governments. The information on events comes from two officially assembled,
publicly available time-lines, one from the European Commission (EC)5 and
another one from the European Central Bank6 which list all the policy decisions
taken by the eurozone governments and provide the press releases associated with
these decisions.
A particular problem in event studies is to define the time period over which the
impact of an event is measured. For instance, in event studies investigating the
impact of earnings announcements on a firm’s value, it is common to define an
event time window including the day of the announcement as well as the day
immediately before and the day immediately after the announcement. Here we








Interest rates of Greek government bonds (10 years)
Fiscal assistance






a referendum on 
austerity
Fiscal assistance
Package (50 Bill. €)
Diﬃcult forming 
of a government 
aer elecons
Fig. 2 Greek government bond interest rates, 2009–2013
5 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/crisis/index_en.htm.
6 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/crisis.de.html.
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against the possibility of assigning the wrong date to an event. As a robustness
check, we also performed the event study with longer time windows (up to 10 days)
and found that our results are not significantly affected by this choice.7
In order to study the impact of an event on the bond yield, it is necessary to create
a benchmark that resembles the performance of a bond in absence of the event under
investigation. In stock market event studies one typically resorts to a market
portfolio of stocks similar to the stock under investigation (MacKinley 1997). The
bond market analogue of a market portfolio would be a euro area average of bond
yields, or even a world-wide average. However this approach is problematic
because the correlation between the average eurozone bond yield and yields of crisis
countries is very weak.
Theory suggests that the yield of any bond should be equal to the risk-free interest rate
plus a risk premium reflecting investor’s expectations of the future solvency of the bond
issuer.Assuming that risk aversiondoes not vary (verymuch)with time, the yield should
remain the same as long as there is no event that changes investor’s expectations. We
provide two different benchmarks that are based on that proposition. Our first
benchmark (BM1) is the yield of day before the event window starts. This means, we
implicitly assume that the bond yields follow a simple random walk. If we denote the
country i’s government bond yield observed at day t with Ri;t, the assumption can be
formalized as follows:Ri;t ¼ Ri;s1 þ i;t, whereRs ¼ Rt10 is the first day of the event
window and it is a zero-mean error term. The second benchmark (BM2) is a moving
average of the last 20 observations of yields before the event window starts.
The benchmarks are used to calculate the abnormal returns associated with a
given event. For our first two benchmarks the abnormal return on day t is the
difference between the actual yield on that day and the benchmark yield, i.e. ARi;t ¼
Ri;t  Ri;s1 in the case of benchmark 1 and ARi;t ¼ Ri;t  120
Ps1
v¼s21 Ri;v in the case
of benchmark 2. In addition, we calculate one more measure of abnormal returns
(BM3), which is based on the assumption that the bond yields follow a first-order
autoregressive process
Ri;v ¼ ai þ biRi;s1 þ i;v; ð7Þ
We run this regression for each country in our sample excluding those days which
belong to an event time window. The abnormal return (AR) on day t is then simply
calculated as the difference between the actual yield and the predicted yield:
ARi;t ¼ Ri;t  a^i  b^iRi;s1; ð8Þ
where a^i; b^i denote the estimated parameters of the AR (1) process.
Using the abnormal returns, one can draw inferences on the impact of a given
event on the bond yield. Our main interest in this event study is to see which
categories of events have an impact on the behavior of government bond yields. For
that purpose we calculate the cumulated abnormal return associated with events. For
an event occurring on day t, the cumulated abnormal return is
7 In the text, we only report the results based on the 9-day windows. Results for other time windows are
available from the authors on request.






We want to test wether any particular category of event has a positive or negative
impact on a country’s government bond yield. In order to test that, we perform a
sign test. Under the null hypothesis that an event category (e.g., ‘‘economic fore-
cast’’) has no impact on the yield, the expected value of the cumulated abnormal
returns associated with the events in that category is zero. Assuming further that the
CARs are symmetrically distributed, it is equally probable that the CAR associated
with any event in the category is positive or negative.
Now let N be the total number of events in a given event category and let Nþ be
the number of events for which the cumulated abnormal return is positive. Then the










Under our assumptions, h follows asymptotically a standard normal distribution
(MacKinley 1997). Hence, the calculated hs can be compared to the critical values
of the standard normal distribution.
4.1 Economic forecast events
The EC publishes twice a year forecasts of key economic indicators for all EU
member countries, including forecasts of GDP growth and budget deficits. Until
2011, the EC also published interim forecasts between the semiannual forecast
releases. These forecasts are important to investors for assessing the future solvency
of governments. We want to test whether the forecast publications have a significant
impact on government bond yields.
Of the 16 forecasts released in the period between 2009 and 2013, we include
nine forecasts in the event study. The criterion for inclusion is that each of these
forecasts predicted a deterioration either in real GDP growth, in the debt-to-GDP
ratio or in the budget deficit compared to the previous forecast release.8 This is a
conservative criterion for ‘‘bad news’’, because it causes us to leave out all forecast
releases that, although predicting bad economic fundamentals by historical
standards (e.g., higher debt-to-GDP ratios or lower real GDP growth compared to
historical averages), did not constitute a deterioration compared to the precious
forecast. In this (strong) sense all the selected forecasts can be considered ‘‘bad
news’’ for investors, so that they can be expected to increase the interest rate of
government bonds. In principle, we would like to test the hypothesis that bond
yields react to positive forecasts. However, there simply aren’t enough positive
forecasts in the period of observation.
Figure 3 shows the mean of the cumulated abnormal returns associated with the
release of negative economic forecasts 4 days before and 4 days after the day of the
8 A list of event dates is available from the authors on request.
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release. The graph shows that, on average, bond yields rose by over 0.4 percentage
points during the time around the forecast release. Table 4 gives the results of the
sign test for economic forecasts, using the three different benchmarks described
above. For all benchmarks, the sign test is positive and distinct from zero at
conventional significance levels. This can be read as evidence that the government
bond yields indeed react to negative economic forecasts.
4.2 Fiscal assistance events
The most severely hit eurozone countries received fiscal assistance from other
eurozone governments as well as from the IMF. The first country to ask for help was
Greece in May 2010, followed by Ireland in November 2010 and Portugal in May
2011. Assistance funds were only paid out after the ‘‘troika’’, consisting of the
European Commission, ECB and IMF, had assessed the reform programs on which
the assistance was conditioned. The announcements of new disbursements of
assistance funds can therefore be seen as ‘‘good news’’ to the bond market and
should be associated with a reduction in the borrowing costs of the receiving
governments.
Looking at Fig. 4, shows that the mean of cumulated abnormal returns around
fiscal assistance events is small and seems to increase slightly, instead of decrease as
one would expect, during an 8-day period surrounding the day of events. As shown
in Table 5, the fiscal assistance events do not seem to have a significant impact on
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Fig. 3 Cumulated abnormal returns, economic forecast events
Table 4 Sign test for economic forecast events
N Nþ h p value
BM1 45 36 4.025*** 0.000
BM2 45 29 1.938* 0.053
BM3 45 33 3.130*** 0.002
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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to fiscal assistance for all three benchmarks.9 This could suggest either that investors
do not believe that the assistance packages improve the future solvency of the
targeted government sufficiently, or that the market has already priced in the effect
of those packages at an earlier date. However, one should be careful to draw general
conclusions from these results, since the number of events in this category is rather
small.
4.3 Austerity measures
As already mentioned above, the fiscal assistance from eurozone governments and
the IMF was conditioned on fiscal and structural reforms on the part of the receiving
governments. These reforms aimed at cutting the public deficit by reducing (current
and future) government spending and increasing taxes. Hence one would expect to
improve the long-run solvency prospect and thus to bring down the borrowing costs
of the affected governments. Therefore, we selected 36 announcements of ‘‘austerity
measures’’ such as plans to increase taxes, cut spending or to implement structural
reforms. Most of these announcements affected Greece, Ireland and Portugal.
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Fig. 4 Cumulated abnormal returns, fiscal assistance news
Table 5 Sign test for fiscal
assistance events
N Nþ h p value
BM1 14 8 0.535 0.593
BM2 14 8 0.535 0.593
BM3 14 8 0.535 0.593
9 Given the small sample size of 14 observed events, the sign test should be interpreted with care.
Alternatively, under the null of no reaction to fiscal assistance news, the probability of observing at least 8
positive CARs out of 14 is 0.212 assuming they are statistically independent. This is evidence for the null.
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In Table 6 we again report the sign tests of these ‘‘austerity events’’. For all three
benchmarks, we do not find a significant effect of the austerity measures. Taken
together with the results from the fiscal assistance packages, one can conclude that
the ‘‘bailout-cum-austerity’’ approach failed to have a measurable effect on the
government borrowing costs. This result is supported by Fig. 5 which shows a very
small reaction of the interest rates during the event time-window. As in the case of
fiscal assistance events, the reaction seems to be in the wrong direction, going up
after the announcement of austerity policies rather than down. This indicates that the
markets did not react to announcements of austerity policies.
However, this result should be interpreted with care. It is conceivable that investors
anticipated some of the austerity measures before their official announcement. If the
announced policies were ‘‘less austere’’ than expected, we would expect the bond
yields to rise instead of fall during the event time-window. If this was the case, our
findings could alternatively be interpreted to show that austerity policies were ‘‘not as
austere’’, on average, as previously expected by the market.
5 Event-dummy regressions
The event study demonstrates that news events have a statistically significant and
predictable effect on the interest rates of crisis-countries’ government bonds.
However, in the sign tests we could use only those events that occur in sufficiently
Table 6 Sign test for austerity
N Nþ h p value
BM1 36 21 1.000 0.317
BM2 36 20 0.667 0.505
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Fig. 5 Cumulated abnormal returns, austerity news
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large number which requires that they occur in all crisis countries. Yet, we have
argued above that the sources and triggers of the crises have been quite different
between countries. We therefore present in this section an approach that allows us to
include singular country-specific events.
We start with the Greek example that is visualized in Fig. 2. We explain the
change in the Greek interest rate only by the events used in the event study above
and a set of additional Greece-specific events. As in the previous section, all events
are taken from the publicly available time-lines mentioned above. The Greece-
specific events included in these regressions fall in three categories: national policy
actions or policy-related developments (such as public protests against austerity
measures), extra-ordinary interventions by the ECB in the government bond markets
such as the Securities Market Program (SMP), the Long-Term Refinancing
Operations (LTRO), and the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), and changes
in credit ratings by rating agencies. Our hypothesis is that all these events contained
(good or bad) news for bond investors and hence should be associated with
significant changes in the interest rate.
Using the first difference of the interest rate solves two problems: (1) it gives us a
stationary series which allows us to use simple OLS regressions and (2) it eliminates
those fundamental determinants of interest rates which do not change from 1 day to
another for reasons unrelated to the events. Employing a regression approach also
allows us to assess the economic importance of an event by looking at the size of the
estimated coefficients. The coefficient of the event dummy gives the average effect
of the event on the daily interest rate change in percentage points. Moreover, it is
instructive to analyze how much of the variation in the data is explained by any
given set of events.
By far the most important event dwarfing everything else is the debt rescheduling
in March 2012, also known as ‘‘haircut’’, which brought down the Greek interest
rate by 27 percentage points (see column (2) in Table 7). This single-day event
explains 76 % of the variation in the bond yield. Large increases in the Greek
interest rate were associated with the political uncertainty dummy as well as with
the 2011 referendum on austerity measures. The extraordinary policy measures by
the ECB (the SMP, LTRO and OMT programs) significantly reduced the interest
rate for Greece, although the effects seem to be rather small. It should be kept in
mind, however, that our regressions only capture short-run effects and cannot assess
any long-run effects these measures might have had.
In columns (4) and (5) in Table 7 we included a dummy for credit downgrading
events. Credit rating agencies base their rating decisions on country-specific news
and some analysis of the fundamentals. In so far as the credit rating agencies have
some information about fundamentals that the general public doesn’t have, there
should be a significant (positive) effect of downgrading events. We focused on
Moody’s credit ratings to construct the downgrading dummies since they can be
taken to be representative of the ratings of other agencies.10 The estimated
coefficient in column (4) is negative, indicating a decline in the Greek interest rate
10 Downgrading decisions were highly synchronized across rating agencies so that the choice of agency
doesn’t affect the results.
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Table 7 Event-dummy regressions: Greece, 1/1/2007-9/3/2013
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Common events Haircut All, without ratings Ratings only All
Assistance -0.01 - 0.164**
(0.120) (0.062) (0.062)
Austerity -0.17*** 0.0236 0.001
(0.065) (0.029) (0.031)
Forecast - 0.021 0.014
(0.062) (0.029) (0.0344)






















Constant 0.01 0.02** 0.009* 0.014 0.006
(0.019) (0.01) (0.009) (0.019) (0.009)
Adj. R2 0.004 0.762 0.793 0.002 0.794
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741 1741
Assistance, Austerity, and Forecast: see previous section for description; Haircut: announcement of
private sector involvement on the March 12th 2012 (single day event); EDP: European Commission
announcement of Excessive Debt Procedures; Eurostat: Eurostat report on fraudulent statistics from the
Greek government; SMP: announcement of Securities Market Program by the ECB on May 9th 2010;
LTRO: announcement of Long-Term Refinancing Operations by the ECB on December 8th 2011;
Political uncertainty: political protest activity around the introduction of austerity measures and the
difficult time forming the government in May 2012; Troika: reports by the troika; Rescheduling:
announcement of debt rescheduling on June 21st 2011; Referendum: announcement of a referendum on
austerity measures on October 31st 2011; OMT: first announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions
program by the ECB on July 26th 2012; Downgrading: downgrading in Greece’s country rating. All event
windows are set to 9, 4 days before and after the event day, unless otherwise indicated
Robust stand. errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5, 1 %
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around downgrading events, which is a paradoxical result. After controlling for
other events, the downgrading coefficient has the expected sign but is rather small in
size [see column (5)]. Taken together, these results suggest, that the mildly negative
effect of downgradings is confounded by other events occurring around the same
time. One caveat in interpreting this result is that we only look at downgrading
decisions and leave out warnings which are typically issued by the rating agencies in
advance. This reduces the marginal news content embodied in downgrading
decisions and may bias our estimates downward.
We applied the same approach to three other countries: Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain (see Tables 12, 13, 14 in ‘‘Appendix 2’’). We left out Italy for the event
regression exercise, because there were too little Italy-specific events that could
have been employed in a meaningful way in these regressions. For Ireland and
Spain, the most drastic movements in the interest rate occurred around events
involving the domestic banking sector. In the case of Ireland, the nationalization of
Anglo Irish Bank in January 2009 led to a first jump in the government interest rate,
followed by further increases during autumn 2010, when major Irish banks faced
severe refinancing problems and the government stepped in by means of large-scale
capital injections. In Spain, the government bailout for Bankia in May 2012 had a
similar impact. In contrast to Greece, the official assistance packages from the EU
and the IMF seem to have had a significant (negative) impact on Irish borrowing
costs. In Portugal and Spain, we find some significant positive effect of
downgrading events.
We also find that the extraordinary policy measures pursued by the ECB had a
sizable dampening impact on government borrowing costs, although the size of the
effect varies across countries. For instance, the announcement of the SMP reduced
the Spanish interest rate by about 0.2 percentage point per day, whereas the effect
on the Irish interest rate was 0:4 percentage points per day. The effect of the
LTRO announcement seems to be less clear. The first announcement of the OMT
did have a negative impact on Greek and Spanish interests rate, while the effect on
Irish and Portuguese yields is (statistically) insignificant.
The evidence on the effect of the extraordinary actions by the ECB could be
interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, these programs helped to improve the
solvency of troubled governments by reducing their interest payment burden
directly or indirectly by supporting the national banking systems which, in turn,
reduced the likelihood of costly government bailouts in the future. In this sense, the
announcement of the extraordinary ECB actions constituted ‘‘good news’’ on the
fundamental determinants of debt sustainability. On the other hand, these
announcements can also be understood as signals on the part of the ECB to
prevent self-fulfilling bad equilibria in the government bond markets. Indeed, these
programs have sometimes been defended precisely on this theory. On this second
interpretation, our findings suggest that the interest spreads in the eurozone were at
least party driven by self-fulfilling sentiments.
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6 Summary and conclusion
The recent debate on interest rates on government bonds has very much
concentrated on irrationality, sentiments, and multiple equilibria. Most of the
evidence presented by the existing literature is based on panel regressions using low
frequency data. We find these regressions problematic for three reasons: first, it is
often unclear which explanatory variables to include in the regression and what
functional form should be used. Second, we showed in this paper that the poolability
assumption underlying the panel approach is not met in the present case of European
countries. Third, the results obtained from these regressions could be spurious due
to the non-stationarity of both the dependent and independent variables.
We therefore turn our attention to daily data and analyze the impact of singular
news events on the interest rates of government bonds. The event study shows
consistently that bad news on fiscal fundamentals such as debt-to-GDP ratios, budget
deficits and real growth prospects are associated with increasing government bond
yields. What is more important for the political debate, however, is that we find no
measurable reaction of interest rates to the announcement of austerity measures or
fiscal assistance packages. Hence, while our results indicate that government interest
rates in the eurozone do indeed respond to economic forecasting news, we do not find
evidence that there was a measurable reaction to the political actions taken by the
European governments. In contrast, the event dummy regressions reveal a significant
effect of the extraordinary interventions by the ECB (e.g., the securities market
program) on interest rates, particularly for Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.
The difficulty to find significant effects of policy actions when pooling over
countries stems from the heterogeneity of the crisis countries. As becomes clear in
the event dummy regressions, each country is different with regard to the underlying
causes as well as the chronological development of the crisis. It seems that the only
characteristic all crisis countries have in common is their membership in the
eurozone. Methodologically, there is therefore no good reason to group those
countries together at any level of aggregation in order to look for common
determinants of government interest rates. Politically, it seems important to take the
differences in the sources of the crisis into account by designing country-specific
policy actions to overcome the crisis.
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Appendix 1: Data sources
See Table 8.
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Appendix 2: Regression tables and tests not included in main text
See Tables 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14.
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Table 9 Unit root and stationarity tests, debt-to-GDP ratios
ADF unit root test KPSS test for stationarity
Test MacKinnon Test
Statistic p value Statistic
Austria -5.023*** 0.000 0.175**
Belgium 1.642 0.998 0.252***
Czech Republic -4.186*** 0.001 0.141*
Denmark -4.776*** 0.000 0.241***
Finland -0.726 0.840 0.251***
France -25.542*** 0.000 0.227***
Greece -0.611 0.869 0.243***
Hungary -4.829*** 0.000 0.141*
Ireland 17.324*** 0.000 0.276***
Italy -1.897 0.334 0.241***
Netherlands -10.633*** 0.000 0.214**
Norway -5.959*** 0.000 0.226***
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Table 9 continued
ADF unit root test KPSS test for stationarity
Test MacKinnon Test
Statistic p value Statistic
Poland -11.920*** 0.000 0.139**
Portugal -2.401 0.141 0.242***
Spain 2.763 1.000 0.278***
Sweden -2.625* 0.088 0.062
United Kingdom 0.561 0.987 0.253**
ADF-H0: Debt-GDP ratio relative to Germany contains unit root. Interpolated Dickey-Fuller critical
values: -2.607 (10 %), -2.947 (5 %), -3.621 (10 %). The maximum lag length is set to 4. KPSS-H0:
Debt-GDP ratio relative to Germany is trend-stationary. Critical values: 10 % 0.119, 5 % 0.146, 1 %
0.216. The maximum lag length is set to 4
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
Table 10 Unit root and stationarity tests, interest rate spreads
ADF unit root test KPSS stationarity test
Test MacKinnon Test
Statistic p value Statistic
Austria -6.043*** 0.000 0.167**
Belgium -3.121** 0.025 0.191**
Czech Republic -3.367*** 0.012 0.138*
Denmark -18.054*** 0.000 0.097
Finland -10.627*** 0.000 0.141*
France -5.478*** 0.000 0.204**
Greece 0.420 0.982 0.213**
Hungary -3.319** 0.014 0.073
Ireland 1.166 0.996 0.175**
Italy -2.754* 0.065 0.220***
Netherlands -8.933*** 0.000 0.144*
Norway -8.417*** 0.000 0.196**
Poland -2.497 0.116 0.200**
Portugal -0.303 0.925 0.199**
Spain 1.446 0.997 0.247***
Sweden -10.812*** 0.000 0.176**
United Kingdom -2.485 0.119 0.192**
ADF-H0: Spread relative to Germany contains unit root. Interpolated Dickey-Fuller critical values:-2.607
(10 %), -2.947 (5 %), -3.621 (10 %). The maximum lag length is set to 4. KPSS-H0: Spread relative to
Germany is trend-stationary. Critical values: 10 % 0.119, 5 % 0.146, 1 % 0.216. The maximum lag
length is set to 4
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5, and 1 %, respectively
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Table 11 Alternative specifications taking variable non-stationarity into account
MG model including a time tend Common correlated effects MG estimator
All countries EMU-countries only All countries EMU-countries only
Debt 0.019 0.054*** -0.005 -0.007
(0.013) (0.017) (0.008) (0.006)
Growth -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.026 -0.011
(0.014) (0.010) (0.025) (0.013)
Deficit 0.014 -0.088 0.027 -0.010
(0.024) (0.067) (0.042) (0.045)
Trend 0.012* 0.019
(0.007) (0.013)
av. Spread 0.452*** 0.393***
(0.147) (0.131)
av. Debt 0.019** -0.007
(0.020) (0.007)
av. Growth -0.006 -0.036***
(0.026) (0.011)
av. Deficit 0.023 0.020
(0.048) (0.048)
Constant -0.537 -4.438 0.782 0.704***
(1.104) (1.658) 0.581 (0.192)
Observations 833 490 833 490
Groups 17 10 17 10
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
Table 12 Event-dummy regressions: Ireland, 1/1/2007-9/3/2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common events All, without ratings Ratings only All
Assistance -0.027*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Austerity -0.003 -0.013 -0.013
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009)




AIB nationalization 0.201*** 0.202***
(0.043) (0.043)
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Table 12 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common events All, without ratings Ratings only All
Banking crisis 0.127*** 0.127***
(0.022) (0.022)










Constant 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Adj. R2 0.005 0.065 0.001 0.065
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741
Assistance, Austerity, Forecast: see previous section for description; EDP: European Commission
announcement Excessive Debt Procedures; AIB nationalization: announcement of nationalization of
Anglo Irish Bank; Banking crisis: climax of the refinancing problems of major Irish banks in November
2010 (30 days); Banks downgrading: Moody’s decision to downgrade Irish bank debt to junk status; SMP:
announcement of securities market program by the ECB on May 9th 2010; LTRO: announcement of
long-term refinancing operations by the ECB on December 8th 2011; OMT: first announcement of
Outright Monetary Transactions program by the ECB on July 26th 2012; Downgrading: change in
Ireland’s country rating. All event windows are set to 9, 4 days before and after the event day, unless
otherwise indicated
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
Table 13 Event-dummy regressions: Spain, 1/1/2007-9/3/2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common events All, without ratings Ratings only All
Austerity 0.003 0.005 0.004
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
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Table 13 continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)













Constant -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Adj. R2 0.003 0.030 0.002 0.032
Observations 1741 1741 1741 1741
Assistance, Austerity, and Forecast: events described in previous section; EDP: European Commission
announcements of Excessive Deficit Procedures; Downgrading: change in official country ratings;
Bankia: Bankia’s request for a government bailout; Stresstest: announcement of European Banking
Supervision stresstests; Protests: political protest activities against proposed austerity policies; SMP: start
of the ECB’s securities market program; LTRO: announcement of long-term refinancing operations by
the ECB on December 8th 2011; OMT: first announcement of Outright Monetary Transactions program
by the ECB on July 26th 2012; Downgrading: change in Spain’s country rating. All event windows are set
to 9, 4 days before and after the event day, unless otherwise indicated
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** Significance at the level of 10, 5 and 1 %, respectively
Table 14 Event-dummy regressions: Portugal, 1/1/2007-9/3/2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Common events All, without ratings Ratings only All
Assistance -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027)
Austerity 0.018 0.042 0.036
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
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